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Abstract: While the Appeals Chambers of the International Criminal Court reversed 
the Pre-trial Chamber I‟s decision not issue a warrant of arrest in respect of the 
crime genocide against President Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan on the basis of existence 
of genocide intent, this article argues that the present definition of genocide is too 
narrow in scope. It excludes a significant category of victims groups, which 
undermines the prohibition of the crime of genocide. The crime of genocide ought to 
be redefined in order to protect all victim groups. 
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“The law must be stable, but it must not stand still" 
- Roscoe Pound, (Introduction to the Philosophy of Law, 1922). 
 
Introduction 
  The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC) on April 3
rd 2010 
reversed the Pre-Trial Chamber I‟s (Chamber) decision that rejected the Prosecutor‟s 
request to issue a warrant of arrest for the arrest of President Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan on 
genocide. The Chamber, however, issued a warrant of arrest for two other crimes; crimes 
against humanity and war crimes alleged to have been committed against the members of 
the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa groups of Darfur Sudan. The Appeals Chamber agreed with 
the minority opinion of Judge Ušacka on the standard of proof requirement under Article 58 
of the ICC Statute.
1 The only standard of proof required for a successful issuance of a 
warrant of arrest under the Statute requires an inference of genocidal intent that is 
reasonable, but not one that provides a reasonable conclusion based on the evidence 
produced.
2   
  The present definition of genocide was a political compromise reached in 1948 in 
order to accommodate the concerns of the delegates of Great Britain and the former Soviet 
Union Republics who argued that the inclusion of political and other groups would weaken 
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide 
Convention) of 1948 (Kuper, 1982). In other words, the inclusion of political and other 
groups in the definition of genocide would have discouraged member states from signing 
and finally ratifying the Genocide Convention, which is true, since it took the United States 
of America 40 years to ratifying the convention (Powers, 2002). 
                                                           
1 See Article 58 of the ICC Statute http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm  (Last visited January 4, 2011) 
  
2 See Dissenting Opinion, para 32, 34 http://212.159.242.181/iccdocs/doc/doc644001.pdf (Last visited January 6, 
2011) 
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  In this article I argue that the International Criminal Court‟s (ICC) failure to indict 
the President of Sudan, Omar Al Bashir (defendant) with genocide lies solely on the Rome 
Statute‟s adopted definition of genocide.
3 Genocide requires that the acts, (a) killing 
members of the group, (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group, 
(c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part, (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the 
group, and (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group, be committed 
against a racial, religious, national or ethnic group and be done with the specific intent 
(dolus specialis) of destroying the group in whole or in part “as such.”
4 It is my argument 
that the exclusion of targeted groups such as women, social or economic classes, cultural 
and political groups undermines the adjudication of the crime of genocide and hence 
catalyzing impunity in preventing and prosecuting genocide, the gravest crime against 
humanity, as its gravity aims at the systematic extermination of human groups.  The Rome 
Statute that established the ICC adopted the definition of genocide under the Genocide 
Convention, which I contend has definite defects. The first obvious defect is the protected 
groups. The protected groups are limited to national, ethnical, racial or religious and do not 
include social or political groups. The second defect is the element of intent, which requires 
“specific intent” (dolus specialis), a standard that is ambiguously difficult to meet. The Trial 
Chamber‟s dissenting opinion of Judge Ušacka and international jurisprudence on dolus 
specialis is evidence of this difficulty. I therefore join the debate over the proper definition 
of genocide; a debate that will definitely continue unabated for years to come.  
  The United Nations Commission of Inquiry (CoI) on Darfur was given a mandate by 
the United Nations Secretary General to investigate reports of violations of international 
humanitarian law and human rights law in Darfur by all parties and to determine whether or 
                                                           
3 Article 6 of the ICC Statute is verbatim to Article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, 1948. 
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not acts of genocide have occurred, and to identify the perpetrators of such violations so 
that they should be found responsible and held accountable to the atrocities.
5 Section II of 
the Report entertained the issue whether or not genocide was being committed in Darfur 
and concluded that the Government of Sudan has not pursued a policy of genocide, and 
stated that although there may have been genocidal intent in the part of individuals of the 
Sudanese government, a court of competent jurisdiction should examine the evidence and 
make a legal finding if such is the case.
6 
To this juncture my discussion proceeds in five sections. Section II discusses the 
genesis of the definition of genocide, a discussion on how this definition has evolved. 
Section III discusses the variations on the definition of genocide. Section IV provides an 
analysis on Judge Ušacka‟s dissenting opinion on the prosecutor‟s application for a warrant 
of arrest against the defendant as a foundation on this article‟s argument for a need of 
redefining genocide as the opinion provides a progressive interpretation of the definition of 
genocide. Section V provides an analysis on the jurisprudence on dolus specialis and how 
the ad hoc tribunals have dealt with this underlining element in the definition of genocide. 
This section describes why Article 6 of the Statute is given such an interpretation and how it 
should be interpreted. Section VI concludes the discussion by summing up important issues 
and provides a challenge on the way forward. 
The genesis of the definition of Genocide 
  The negotiation history of the 1948 Convention reveals the intention of the drafters 
of the definition of genocide. They intended a flexible and progressive definition that will 
meet the evolving demands of the time.
7 The two unprotected victim groups, social and 
                                                           
5 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary General, Pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 1564 (2004) of September 18, 2004, p.2. 
 
6 Id., at pp. 124 – 132.  
7 See United Nations Report on the Study of the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, E/CN.4/Sub. 2/416, July 4, 1978, pp. 13 – 24 particularly paragraphs. 46 – 91; See also Revised and 
Updated Report on the Question of the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide Prepared by B. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Sungi 
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political were included in the original draft of the Convention; however the former U.S.S.R. 
opposed to the inclusion of these groups. The Russian representative argued that the 
inclusion of political groups was not in conformity with the scientific definition of genocide 
and would in practice, distort the perspective in which the crime should be viewed and 
impair the efficacy of the Convention, giving the notion an extension of meaning contrary to 
the fundamental conception of genocide as recognized by science (Kuper, 1981, p.25). 
Not all delegates accepted the Russian delegation‟s contention, although it ended up 
being the adopted definition under the Genocide Convention. The Haitian representative 
cautioned the delegates on the consequences of excluding social and political groups in the 
definition stating, “[s]ince it was established that genocide always implied the participation 
or complicity of Governments, that crime would never be suppressed. The government 
which is responsible for committing genocide would always be able to allege that the 
extermination of any group had been dictated by political considerations such as the 
necessity for quelling an insurrection or maintaining public order” (Kuper, 1981, p.28).  
 
 
Variation of definitions of genocide 
 Thus the present narrow definition of the victim groups which lies at the heart of the 
genocide convention was the direct result of a political compromise based on the fear that 
the inclusion of social and political groups would expose nations to external intervention in 
their domestic concerns, and might endanger the future of the convention because many 
States would be unwilling to ratify it. Since there was a sense that the defined groups under 
Article II would not provide the necessary intended purpose, that is, to protect all victim 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Whitaker, Review of Further Developments in Fields with which the Sub-Commission has been concerned, U.N. 
ESCOR, Human Rights Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, 38
th 
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groups, several scholars have come up with alternative definitions of genocide that intend to 
include all the victim groups.  
Drost opined that the omission of political and other groups from the genocide 
convention would be used by governments to exploit this obvious loophole. Rejecting the 
notion that the victims of genocide were limited to racial, religious, national, and ethnic 
groups, he proposed that the United Nations redefine genocide as “the deliberate 
destruction of physical life of individual human beings by reason of their membership of any 
human collectivity as such” (Drost, 1959, p.125).  
Horowitz amended the definition of genocide to emphasize “a structural and 
systematic destruction of innocent people by a state bureaucratic apparatus” (Horowitz, 
1976). In the 1980s, Fein developed a broader and deeper sociological definition of 
genocide and concluded that “genocide is a sustained purposeful action by a perpetrator to 
physically destroy a collectivity directly or indirectly, through interdiction of the biological 
and social reproduction of group members, sustained regardless of the surrender or lack of 
threat offered by the victim” (Fein, 1988). In this definition Fein included political and social 
groups as victims and excluded deaths resulting from warfare. 
          Chalk elucidates recent literature pointing to the importance assigned to 
intentionality. “A genocidal society exists when a government and its citizens persistently 
pursue policies which they know will lead to the annihilation of the aboriginal inhabitants of 
their country. Intentionality is demonstrated by persistence in such policies whether or not 
the intent to destroy the aboriginal groups is verbalized” (Andreopoulos, 1994, p.53).  
  Wallimann and Dobkowski argue that  the emphasis on intentionality in the definition 
of genocide is antiquated in the present age because individuals are no longer dominated by 
the will of given people but market mechanisms, bureaucracies, distant decision making by 
committees and parliaments. They state that “in the modern age, the issue of intentionality 
on the societal level is harder to locate because of the anonymous and amorphous structural Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Sungi 
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forces that dictate the character of our world” (Andreopoulos, 1994, p.54). The idea that 
“only intentional or planned massive destruction of human lives should be called genocide 
leads to the neglect of those processes of destruction which, although massive, are so 
systematic and systemic, that they appear so „normal‟ to the extent that most individuals 
involved at some level of the process of destruction may never see the need to make an 
ethical decision or even reflect upon the consequences of their action (Andreopolus, 1994, 
p.54). 
        In Kuper‟s (1981) book Genocide, he gives an analytical discussion on the genocidal 
process and motivations that emerge as challenges in defining genocide. Kuper‟s analysis of 
modern genocides clusters the motives of the perpetrator around three categories: (1) 
genocides designed to settle religious, racial, and ethnic differences; (2) genocides intended 
to terrorize a people conquered by a colonizing empire; and (3) genocides perpetrated to 
enforce or fulfill a political ideology. Kuper is worried about the increasing frequency of 
genocidal events in the modern period. Since modern genocides, as he defines them, 
usually occur within nation-states that have the character of plural societies, the creation of 
new multiethnic states during the period of colonization and decolonization becomes 
particularly significant for his analysis.  
In his later book, The Prevention of Genocide (1985) Kuper laments the critical 
omission of political mass murder in the definition of genocide under the genocide 
convention and brings it into his genocide analysis two main groups: domestic genocides 
arising on the basis of internal divisions within a society, and genocides arising in the course 
of international warfare. He lists four types of domestic genocide, which are: (1) genocides 
against indigenous peoples; (2) genocides against hostage groups, a category that includes 
the Holocaust; (3) genocide following upon decolonization of a two-tier structure of 
domination; and (4) genocide in the process of struggles by ethnic or racial or religious 
groups for power or secession, greater autonomy, or more equality. Under international Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Sungi 
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warfare Kuper includes the United States‟ nuclear destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
the Chinese invasion and occupation of Tibet, the Indonesian invasion and occupation of 
East Timor, and the American war in Vietnam amounting to genocide (Kuper, 1985).   
 
Judge Ušacka’s dissenting opinion on the Bashir ruling 
  Even though the majority opinion on the Bashir decision ruled that the defendant is 
criminally responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity and that a warrant of 
arrest should be issued for these crimes, Judge Ušacka‟s minority opinion invites a 
discussion on her reasoning on the finding of genocide. Judge Ušacka disagrees with the 
majority and is satisfied that the defendant possessed genocidal intent and thus criminally 
responsible for genocide. This section dives into the opinion and divulges the analysis 
behind the reasoning, which is in my opinion a progressive interpretation of the definition of 
genocide. The opinion raises three issues in determining whether Bashir is criminal 
responsible under Article 6 of the Statute for (1) Genocide by killing,
8 (2) Genocide by 
causing serious bodily or mental harm,
9 (3) Genocide by deliberately inflicting conditions of 
life calculated to bring about destruction of the group.
10 For the purposes of proving 
genocidal intent the Elements of Crimes 
11 (EoC), provides first, for proof of a contextual 
element to establish that a genocidal conduct occurred “in the context of a manifest pattern 
of similar conduct” directed against a protected group, or that the conduct “could itself 
                                                           
8 Article 6(a) of the Rome Statute. 
 
9 Article 6(b). 
 
10 Article 6(c). 
 
11 Pursuant to article 9, the Elements of Crimes shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application of articles 
6, 7 and 8, consistent with the Statute. The provisions of the Statute, including article 21 and the general principles 
set out in Part 3, are applicable to the Elements of Crimes.  
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effect such destruction [of the group]”.
12 A second common element requires proof that the 
victims are members of the protected group, national, ethnical, racial or religious.
13 A third 
common element requires the intention to “destroy, in whole or in part, the national, 
ethnical, racial and religious group, as such.
14  
On the first issue, whether there was reasonable ground to believe that each of the 
common elements was met, Judge Ušacka ruled that the contextual element had been met. 
In interpreting the term “manifest pattern” the judge employed the ordinary meaning (or 
plain meaning) as provided under Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties
15 and stated that the term referred to a systematic, clear pattern conduct in which 
the alleged genocidal conduct occurs. On the other hand the majority interpreted the same 
term to mean that “the crime of genocide is only completed when the relevant conduct 
presents a concrete threat to the existence of the targeted group, or part thereof.”
16 Judge 
Ušacka reasons that this interpretation by the majority converts the term into a “result-
based” requirement which duplicates the purpose of the second part of the sentence, “or 
was conduct that could itself effect such destruction.”
17 The evidence produced by the 
prosecution showed the existence of a widespread and systematic attack on members of the 
Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa population, in which the learned Judge found to satisfy the 
                                                           
12 Separate and Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušaka, March 4, 2009, p. 7, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639096.pdf (Last visited May 19, 2009). 
 
13 EoC, Articles 6(a)(2), 6(b)(2), and 6(c)(2), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9CAEE830-38CF-
41D6-AB0B-68E5F9082543/0/Element_of_Crimes_English.pdf (Last visited May 19, 2009). 
 
14 EoC, Articles 6(a)(3), 6(b)(3), and 6(c)(3) available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9CAEE830-38CF-
41D6-AB0B-68E5F9082543/0/Element_of_Crimes_English.pdf (Last visited May 19, 2009). 
 
15 “A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.” 
 
16 Paragraph 124 of the Majority decision on the Prosecutor‟s application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar 
Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639096.pdf (Last visited May 19, 
2009). 
 
17 Elements of Crimes, Article 6(a)(4). 
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“manifest pattern” paradigm and hence consistent with the statutory definition of genocide 
as currently defined. 
On the second issue whether the victims are members of the protected group, the 
Judge ruled that the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa were a stigmatized group by the perpetrator 
and hence qualified as a protected group that falls within the definition.  The prosecution‟s 
evidence shows that the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa were targeted by the Government of 
Sudan (GoS) because they were accused of being rebels, or supporting the rebels fighting 
the GoS. A prosecution witness testified that when asked who he had to fight, he 
responded, “[w]hat he said is I do not want any, one single village for the Zurgas in 
Darfur.”
18 The Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa are targeted as a unitary as “African tribes” who 
are racially distinct from the “Arab tribes” the perceived perpetrators. The learned Judge 
henceforth defines the targeted population “as a single ethnic group of the African tribes 
who make up a protected group.”
19  
On the third issue, whether the defendant had intention (dolus specialis) to destroy, 
in whole or in part, the protected groups, Judge Ušacka held that there was reasonable 
ground to believe that the defendant had genocidal intent. A finding of dolus specialis is 
particularly an intricate legal endeavor since the perpetrator may not explicitly show 
genocidal intent, which is normally inferred by way of speech. According to Judge Ušacka‟s 
opinion, four elements need to be proved before a finding of dolus specialis is affirmed: (1) 
an accused possessed intent, that is, the intent consisted of the intent to destroy; (2) the 
intent was to destroy a group or a substantial part thereof; and (3) the intent to destroy a 
group consisted of the intent to destroy the group as such.  
                                                           
18 Witness Transcript, DAR-OTP-0147-0071 at 0114, lines 1457-1463. The term “Zurga” is a racial slur for non-
Arab peasants derived from the Arabic word for black), and the inhabitants of the urban centers. 
 
19 Dissent opinion, p. 13. 
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First, the existence of intent, as I have stated above, may be manifested by way of 
communication, for instance, words and utterances used by the offender-perpetrator. The 
prosecution in this case, submitted evidence to this effect. One witness reported that; 
“In April 2003, the President, Al-Bashir, went to AL FASHER and publicly gave orders 
to the military to eliminate the opposition and leave no survivors …. Having received 
orders from their chief, the military then went to African villages and left nothing 
behind. Together with the Janjaweed, they burned houses, killed small children and 
raped girls. They did not attack the opposition or rebels even though they knew 
where they were. These rebel bases were well-known to people in the area and the 
Government. They only attacked civilian villages which could not inflict damage to 
the military”.
20 
 
A number of witnesses reported that code words were used to refer to the victims‟ race. 
During one of the attacks the Janjaweed insulted the victims by calling them wives and 
mothers of Toro Bora (rebels) and calling them black Nubas. They also told their victims 
that they had permission from the government to wipe them out, and kill them.
21 Some 
secret memorandum also referred to “intent” as the National Islamic Front (NIF) planned to 
undermine and exterminate the Fur so that Darfur remains safe.
22 Further intent can be 
implied from the planning and mobilization supported by the Khartoum government, by 
arming the civilian Arab, Gimir and Tama populations that are not the African populations of 
Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa. A witness testified that the distribution of arms was restricted to 
Arabs, Tama and Gimir. The Bashir government recruited and trained the Arabs with the 
coordination of the police.  “The GoS believed that the strongest rebel component was the 
Zaghawa tribe and that therefore the Zaghawa tribe had to be destroyed … in similar 
fashion the Government believed that the Masalit and Fur supported the rebels and that 
they therefore had to be driven out of their lands. This was a hidden agenda which only 
obvious from the effect on the ground in Darfur, as told to me by the civilian population, 
                                                           
20 Witness Statement, DAR-OTP-0097-0619 at 0624, and paragraph 21. 
21 Witness Statement, DAR-OTP-0095-0049 at 0076-0077 at paragraph 128. 
 
22 Witness testimony in Darfur Dotting The „i‟s And Crossing the„t‟s by Professor Sulayman Hamid, DAR-OTP-
0150-0105 at 0118. 
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military colleagues and fellow detainees”.
23 The prosecution provided the Trial Chamber with 
evidence that suggested modus operandi as evidence to show the perpetrator‟s intent. For 
example, the evidence demonstrated that the acts of the perpetrator were consistent and 
systematically directed against a protected group.  A witness provided this account of the 
events; 
“All the government soldiers arrived in seven camouflaged-colored Toyota Land 
Cruisers. The trucks had „Doshkas‟ mounted on them. The Janjaweed were on 
horseback and camelback. Some of the Janjaweed were on foot. They started firing 
randomly. At first, nobody thought it was an attack because of the message the 
soldiers had delivered about „Azzakat‟ earlier that morning. When the attackers got 
closer to town, they started killing people and set fire to the huts … 3 combat 
aircrafts also arrived and started bombing the town. There were 2 Antonovs and 1 
Hercules”.
24 
 
Elements showing the breadth and scale of attacks against the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa 
increase the finding of genocidal intent (dolus specialis). The attacks against this protected 
group were widespread as reported by NGOs.  The International Federation for Human 
Rights reported that in March 5, 2004, persons belonging to the Fur tribes were arrested in 
Zaray, Fairgo, Tairgo and Kaskildo and were summarily executed in Delaij, Wadi Salih 
province and in April 2004, the bombing of Mahajrea village killed four civilians, belonging 
to the Zaghawa tribe. Most of these killings have been accompanied by looting and burning 
of properties. Many like cases have been reported, as well as cases of arbitrary arrests.
25 All 
this solidarity was towards building a nucleus of the Arabic, Islamic congregation.
26 All the 
above activities show (1) an existence of execution of a targeted group, (2) a dissemination 
of an extremist ideology, and (3) the screening and selection of victims by the offender-
                                                           
23 Witness Statement, DAR-OTP-0125-0665 at 675, paragraphs 55, 56. 
 
24 Witness Statement, DAR-OTP-0088-0060 at 0064-0072, paragraph 21. 
 
25 Judge Ušacka‟s Dissenting Opinion at paragraph 52. 
 
26 Witness Statement, DAR-OTP-0156-0164 at 0178, paragraph 58. 
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perpetrator on the basis of their membership in the protected group, which show the 
formation of intent.
27  
  Second, the intent to destroy a group could be implied through the extent and nature 
of the intended destruction. In order to show genocidal intent, there must be intent to 
destroy the group in a biological or physical sense.
28 The prosecution provided evidence that 
showed the perpetrator‟s intent to physically destroy the victim group. Evidence was 
produced from an NIF report that stated the intent to destroy, thus; 
“The Revolution has decided to bypass this tribe, (even though) it occupies a 
strategic place in dissemination of the concepts of the Islamic Movement to Western 
and Central Africa. It also occupies an area considered to be the Movement‟s last line 
of defense in the event of its being cornered. The Movement has thus bypassed this 
tribe and undertaken to reinforce other powers in the States of Greater Darfur. It has 
invited heavily armed Chadian tribes into Darfur as well as … promoting divide and 
rule amongst the elements making up the Fur Sultanate (Fur, Tunjur, etc). The 
Movement will not feel safe until this tribe is contained or exterminated and the 
Western front made secure ….
29 
 
Several other witnesses testified that the GoS planned to wipe out the rest of the Zaghawa 
who were still in the Darfur area. The other two tribes, Fur and Masalit were viewed by the 
GoS as supporting the rebels and so they were also to be destroyed.
30 The learned judge in 
her dissenting opinion clearly reasoned by her expansive approach, that the physical 
destruction with genocidal intent is different from the physical destruction with the intent to 
destroy rebels and sources of support for rebels to the extent that they are considered 
combatants. Citing Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions (Additional Protocol I), civilians do 
not lose their protected status and become legitimate targets until they participate in 
                                                           
27 Judge Ušacka‟s Dissenting Opinion, paragraph 46. 
 
28 Id. at paragraph 58. 
 
29 The Islamic Movement and the Fur Tribe Report in Darfur Dotting the „i‟s And Crossing the„t‟s by Professor 
Sulayman Hamid Al Hajj, DAR-OTP-0150-0105 at 0108 and 0115 – 0118.  
 
30 Witness Statement, DAR-OTP-0079-0244. 
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hostilities as combatants.
31 The example of Rwanda genocide affirmed that groups who are 
subjected to genocide are often targeted on the basis of allegations that they posed a threat 
to the offender group. The Hutu perpetrators accused the members of the Tutsi ethnic 
group of supporting the then rebels (Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF)). The perpetrator-
government‟s targeting of Tutsi suspected of supporting the RPF rebels was considered 
evidence of dolus specialis, and not evidence showing intent to target rebels.
32 Judge 
Ušacka therefore disagrees with the Majority opinion that even if the evidence indicated that 
some members of the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa assisted the rebels, such evidence does not 
legitimize estimation that the entire victim group was a lawful target of the offender.
33   
  Third, the existence of intent to destroy a group, as such, is evaluated in the context 
of being a substantial part of the group.
34 However, no quantitative threshold of victims is 
necessary to establish genocidal intent. Citing Kristić, the learned Judge opined “[t]hat if 
only a part of the group is targeted, the proportion of the targeted group in relation to the 
protected group as a whole, as well as the prominence of the targeted group within the 
protected group may be relevant to a determination of substantiality”.
35 The prosecution 
submitted evidence that showed that (1) between 2,705 and 3,413 people were killed in 
connection with the nine attacks on predominantly Fur villages; (2) approximately 530 
people were killed directly in connection with three attacks on predominantly Masalit village, 
and (3) approximately 925 people were killed during the five attacks on predominantly 
Zaghawa villages.
36 The prosecution also submitted the United Nations High Commission for 
                                                           
31 Id. note 27 at paragraph 64. 
 
32 Id. paragraph 65. 
 
33 Id. paragraph 66. 
 
34 Prosecutor v. Krstić, ICTY Case No. IT-98-33-T. 
 
35 Judge Ušacka‟s Dissenting opinion, paragraph 67. 
 
36 Id. at paragraph 68. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Sungi 
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Refugees (UNHCR) data that showed that 97 percent of predominantly Fur and 85 percent 
of predominantly Masalit villages within the area of three administrative units, Habila, Wadi 
Saleh and Mukjar were attacked.
37 The attacks directed to the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa 
qualified the words “as such” that “reemphasizes spirit behind the prohibition of genocide, 
the destruction of the protected group itself, rather than the destruction of its individual 
members”.
38 The CoI report found that; 
“In a vast majority of cases, victims of the attacks belonged to the African tribes, in 
particular the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa tribes, who were systematically targeted on 
political grounds in the context of the counter-insurgency policy of the Government. 
The pillaging and destruction of villages, being conducted on a systematic as well as 
widespread basis in a discriminatory fashion appears to have been directed to bring 
about the destruction of livelihoods and the means of survival of these 
populations.”
39 
 
A witness narrated the course of events that transpired in their village, which corroborates 
evidence that “African tribes” were classified according to their membership in the group, 
prior to the commission of a crime; 
“I had a shop in the market of New Bendisi, and the men destroyed ten barrels of oil 
and looted kebkebay from it. They also took sugar and tea and other things from my 
shop. The looting took place right in front of us, so I could see everything. When the 
Fursan were looting, some other people were assisting them to identify the shops 
which had something to loot. They had placed in advance some special marking on 
the shop doors to identify the ones which were not to be looted. Our shops were in 
one line and there was one man from the Mararit tribe whose shop had a piece of 
green cloth hanging from the door hinge. The shop was not looted. I saw later that 
all other shops which were not looted had similar signs. The collaborators were from 
the Mararit and the Tama tribes.”
40 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
37 Id. at paragraph 69. 
 
38 Id at paragraph 70. 
 
39 Commission of Inquiry on Darfur Report, paragraph 638, available at 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/sudan/com_inq_darfur.pdf (Last visited May 21, 2009). Judge Ušacka‟s Dissenting 
Opinion, paragraph 74. 
 
40 Witness Statement, DAR-OTP-0119-0503 at 0520-0523 at paragraphs 76 – 87.  
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With this analysis Judge Ušacka concluded Bashir possessed the requisite intent to destroy 
the ethnic group of the “African tribes” as such.
41  
Having tackled the mens rea element of the crime of genocide the learned Judge 
went ahead to discuss the actus reus of genocide. The issues analyzed according to the 
charges the prosecution brought forthwith, was an inference of (1) genocide by killing, 
contrary to article 6(b) of the statute; and (3) genocide by deliberate infliction on the group 
conditions of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the group, contrary to 
article 6(c) of the statute.  
On the first issue, the learned Judge cited the Majority‟s finding that there were 
grounds to believe that mass killings took place in the context of a widespread and 
systematic attack on the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa of Darfur and that murders took place in 
the context of the same widespread and systematic attack.
42 She thus concluded “that 
members of the „African tribes‟ were killed as part of the manifest pattern of conduct 
outlined in the Majority Decision within the meaning of article 6(a) of the statute”.
43 
On the second issue, the learned Judge analyzed the prosecution evidence that 
showed that members of the target group were subjected to serious bodily or mental harm, 
including acts of rape, torture and forcible displacement that occurred within the same 
context of the manifest pattern of conduct. To support their application the prosecution 
cited Akayesu that stated that cruel treatment, torture, rape and forcible deportation may 
constitute serious bodily or mental harm.
44 The Trial Chamber also noted and held that 
there were reasonable grounds to believe that acts of torture, forcible transfer, and rape 
occurred in the context of a widespread and systematic attack on the Fur, Masalit and 
                                                           
41 Judge Ušacka‟s Dissenting Opinion, paragraph 76. 
 
42 Id. at paragraph 92. 
 
43 Id. at paragraph 93. 
 
44 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, September 2, 1998, paragraph 504.  
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Zaghawa of Darfur.
45 On the basis of this evidence the learned Judge concluded “that 
members of the “African tribes” were subjected to serious bodily harm as a part of the 
manifest pattern of conduct outlined in the Majority Decision within the meaning of article 
6(b) of the statute”.
46 
On the third issue, whether genocide by deliberate infliction on the group conditions 
of life calculated to bring about the physical destruction of the group, the learned Judge, 
taking to account the prosecution‟s evidence, reasoned that the conditions in the harsh 
terrain in Darfur, in which water and food are naturally scarce by themselves were 
intolerable conditions. The GoS destructive campaign against the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa 
forced this targeted group to find their way to internally displaced people camps where the 
GoS led by Bashir made it difficult for humanitarian assistance to reach them. And hence 
they were deprived of “means of survival, which included food supplies, food sources and 
shelter, in addition to water supplies and sources.”
47 The learned Judge concluded that there 
was sufficient evidence to find that the groups‟ means of survival were systematically 
destroyed to bring about the physical destruction of the “African tribes”.
48 
 
Jurisprudence on Dolus Specialis 
This section is a perfect follow-up to Judge Ušacka‟s dissenting opinion on her 
analysis on the finding of genocide, that is, the criminal acts committed by Bashir amounted 
to genocide. The ad hoc tribunals‟ jurisprudence on genocidal intent is a relevant discussion 
in this article even though their decisions are not binding to the Trial Chamber. Article 6 of 
the statute that provides the intent prong - dolus specialis as was discussed in the 
                                                           
45 Majority Decision, paragraphs 104 – 108. 
 
46 Judge Ušacka‟s Dissenting Opinion, paragraph 96. 
 
47 Id. at paragraph 98. 
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deliberations of the 1948 adoption of the Genocide Convention. The concerns had to do with 
problem of proving dolus specialis, which requires a subjective element that is often difficult 
to either prove and/or establish. The United Kingdom representative argued that its 
inclusion was completely useless and indeed dangerous, for its limitative nature would 
enable those who committed a crime of genocide to claim that they had not committed 
genocide since they lacked „motive‟. The requirement of „intent‟ provides an easy means for 
evading responsibility (Kuper, 1981, pp.33-35). Despite the difficultly of proving dolus 
specialis, international jurisprudence on genocide has provided guidance on the legal 
standard to meet a dolus specialis finding. In Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, the Trial Chamber of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) stated that dolus specialis is a key 
element of an intentional offense, an offense characterized by a psychological nexus 
between the physical result and the mental state of the perpetrator. The Chamber applied 
the reasoning in Akayesu in determining the offender‟s specific intent and stated thus: 
“Intent is a mental factor which is difficult, even impossible, to determine. This is the 
reason why, in the absence of a confession from the accused, his intent can be 
inferred from a certain number of presumptions of fact. The Chamber is of the view 
that the genocidal intent inherent in a particular act charged can be inferred from the 
general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed 
against that same group, whether these acts were committed by the same offender 
or by others. Other factors, such as the scale of atrocities committed, their general 
nature, in a region or a country, or furthermore, the fact of deliberately and 
systematically targeting victims on account of their membership of a particular 
group, while excluding the members of other groups, can enable the Chamber to 
infer the genocidal intent of a particular act”.
49 
 
  The Trial Chamber in Rutaganda also cited the cases of Kayishema and Ruzindana 
Judgment that held that “[i]ntent can be inferred either from words or deeds and may be 
determined by a pattern of purposeful action. In particular, the Chamber considers evidence 
such as the methodical way of planning, the systematic manner of killing […]”.
50 
                                                           
49 ICTR-96-T (6 December 1999) paragraph 60. 
 
50 Id. at paragraph 61. 
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  The Trial Chamber at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) in the Jelisić case held that genocidal intent may be inferred from prior statements 
and acts of the defendant.
51 While the Karadzić and Mladić case held that the “general 
political doctrine that gave rise to the acts” and the “repetition of destructive and 
discriminatory acts” may imply genocidal intent.
52 The Chamber in this case further held 
that the perpetrators‟ acts which violate, or which the perpetrators themselves consider to 
violate the very foundation of the group … committed as part of the same conduct infer 
genocidal intent.
53 
  The above cited jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals provides us with the legal 
incite on determining dolus specialis, which could have been used by the Trial Chamber to 
indict the defendant with genocide. In brief, the genocide definition embodied under Article 
6 of the Rome Statute defines genocide as, killing members of the group; causing serious 
bodily or mental harm to members of the group; imposing conditions on the group 
calculated to destroy it; preventing births within the group; and forcibly transferring 
children from the group to another group; with intent to destroy a national, ethnical, racial 
or religious group as such, should have been interpreted in the light of international case 
law on genocide as analyzed in Judge Ušacka‟s dissenting opinion.  
 
 
Conclusion 
The task of this article is not to discuss the distribution of punishment between the 
finding of war crimes and crimes against humanity on one hand and genocide on the other, 
as far as the ICC Bashir indictment is concerned. Rather this contribution is a critic on the 
                                                           
51 Prosecutor v. Jelisić, Case No. IT-95-10-T, ICTY Trial Chamber Judgment, December 14, 1999, paragraph 73. 
 
52 Prosecutor v. Karadžić and Mladić, Case No. IT-95-5-R61 and IT-95-18-R61, paragraph 294. 
 
53 Id. at paragraph 84. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Sungi 
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definition of genocide as a crime, a gravest crime against humanity. Some will argue that 
there is no need for a new definition of genocide that remedies the legal deficiencies that I 
have attempted to address in this article because the ad hoc tribunal decisions and Judge 
Ušacka‟s dissent ruled as they did by interpreting article 6 of the Statute. This argument 
fails to appreciate the nature of international adjudication and the non-observance of the 
principle of stare decisis that insures legal stability and predictability in most common law 
jurisdictions. This is the reason why an amendment that remedies those uncertainties of the 
definition of genocide as I have discussed in this article will cure the problem of statutory 
interpretation and that will bring about stability and predictability to the international legal 
system. It took a number of years after the Genocide Convention was open for signature, 
for member states to ratify this convention, for example, it took the United States, 40 years 
to ratify it. However, this should not be an excuse for amending article 6, since the ICC is 
an independent legal system that was “established to help end impunity for the perpetrators 
of the most serious crimes of concern to the international community”.
54  A valid argument, 
nevertheless, would be that certain provisions of the Genocide Convention (including article 
II) have been elevated to the level of custom as a source of international law and by 
amending the article 6 of the statute would be creating a new customary rule that is going 
against, predictability, certainty and uniformity, which assumes that the usage is regarded 
by member states as having an obligatory character.
55 Again, a response would be that the 
ICC is an independent institution, established by a law-making treaty, and hence the new 
definition of genocide embodied in the statute will be deemed a creation of a new 
                                                           
54 See http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court (Last visited May 25, 2009). 
 
55 For a detailed discussion on sources of international law, see article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ). See also the North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969) ICJ Rep 3, where the ICJ held: 
“Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but they must be such, or be carried out in 
such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule 
of law requiring it … the States concerned must therefore feel that they are conforming to what amounts to 
a legal obligation. The frequency or even habitual character of the acts is not in itself enough”. 
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international rule of law.
56 As noted within this article, several authorities have called on the 
redefinition of genocide.
57 The Whitaker Commission, an authoritative commission under the 
auspices of the U.N. called for an amendment of the genocide convention to include all 
political mass murders, stating:  
“The fact remains that although the Convention has been in force since 12 January 
1951, any ascertainable effect of it is difficult to quantify, whereas all too much 
evidence continues to accumulate showing that acts of genocide are still being 
committed in various parts of the world. Certainly in its present form, the Convention 
therefore must be judged to be not enough. Further evolution of international 
measures against genocide is necessary and indeed overdue”.
58 
 
This article continues the call from the Whitaker‟s Commission that the genocide demands a 
redefinition that reflects the present day concerns of society and the level of progress 
attained by the same. Terminology such as ethnicity has very ambiguous meaning in the 
present day.  In the case of the Darfur tribes who are victims of attacks and killings, 
subjectively make up a protected group even if not, ethnic, national, racial or religious.  The 
facts and evidence show that in the Darfur situation the Janjaweed militia while attacking 
“African” villages tend to use derogatory epithets such as slaves, blacks, Nuba, that signify 
a subjective group. An example is the Fur woman, who was raped by three men during an 
attack on her village near Kass town; she was told by her attackers, that she was a slave of 
                                                           
56 There are two types of treaty and the relations they have with custom differs tremendously. Law-making treaties 
are directly creative of international law and are used where a particular problem arises and urgently demands a 
creation of a new law, which I argue is the route to go since there is little custom relating to this redefinition of 
genocide that I have discussed extensively in this piece. The second type of treaty is the treaty-contract type, where a 
long established custom is codified into a formal treaty. For further discussion on this issue see ICJ decisions in the 
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1969) ICJ Rep 3: West Germany v. Denmark and the Netherlands (1969) ICJ 
Rep 3. 
 
57 See section II of this article. 
58 Whitaker Report, United Nations Economic and Social Council Commission on Human Rights 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities 
Thirty-eighth session, Item 4 of the provisional agenda, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/6,  2 July 1985, paragraph 71, 
available at http://www.abarundi.org/documents/Whitaker_Report_July_1985.html (Last visited May 25, 
2009). 
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el Bashir, the President of Sudan (Sungi, 2007).  If the definition of genocide under Article 6 
of the Rome Statute is not amended to include social and political groups it will be deemed 
condoning the culture of impunity that is intolerable. The new law should codify dolus 
specialis a high standard of motive, a subjective state of mind, which is notoriously difficult 
to prove according to the discussed sources of international law. Judge Ušacka‟s dissenting 
opinion and the ad hoc tribunal jurisprudence state that such a determination must be 
subjected to an objective assessment, that is, a demonstrated policy persistent in 
destruction of a group, such as is in Darfur, to satisfy the genocidal intent prong. Criminal 
behavior evolves rapidly and so both procedural and substantive rules ought to be adjusted 
in order to cope with present day‟s concerns in society. This is the spirit behind Article 123 
of the Statute that provides a seven year exclusion of any amendment to the statute: 
  “Seven years after the entry into force of this Statute the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations shall convene a Review Conference to consider any amendments to 
this Statute. Such review may include, but is not limited to, the list of crimes 
contained in article 5. The Conference shall be open to those participating in the 
Assembly of States Parties and on the same conditions”. 
 
The redefinition of genocide within the ICC statute may be initiated by any State party, at 
any time, as provided under Article 121(1).
59 A Review Conference will consider this 
amendment and submit the same to the United Nations Secretary General, who circulates it 
to State parties. The Assembly of States Parties and a Review Conference have concurrent 
jurisdiction to consider the amendment, that is, it is the Assembly of State Parties or Review 
Conference that will adopt the amendment either by consensus or a majority of two-thirds 
of all State parties. An amendment that is adopted by one of these bodies does not come 
into force until seven-eighths of States parties have filed instruments accepting it. When the 
adopted amendment has reached the seven-eighths quorum, any other State party that 
                                                           
59 “After the expiry of seven years from the entry into force of this Statute, any State Party may propose 
amendments thereto. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, who shall promptly circulate it to all States Parties”.  For Article 121all sub articles  see 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/statute/romefra.htm (Last visited may 25, 2009) 
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objects to the adoption of the new rule may give notice to withdraw from the Statute.
60   
The statute came into force in 2002 and so this is the appropriate time for the Assembly of 
States Parties to adopt a new definition of genocide that reflects the suggestions proposed 
in this article.   
   
                                                           
60 Id. These procedures of adoption of an amendment to the Rome Statute reflect the basic nature of International 
law. International law is consensus based and hence these rules of law ought to emanate from the free wills of States 
as expressed in conventions or custom, which is generally accepted as expressing a principle of law. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Criminology     Sungi 
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